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DIZZYING GILLESPIE: THE EXAGGERATED DEATH OF
THE BALANCING APPROACH AND THE INESCAPABLE
ALLURE OF FLEXIBILITY IN APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
Bryan Lammon *
INTRODUCTION

In Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., the Supreme Court emphasized
that the final-judgment rule-the general rule delaying appellate
review of a district court decision until the district court reaches a
final judgment on the case-must be given a practical rather than
technical construction.' Gillespie seemed to promise a new approach to federal appellate jurisdiction: a balancing approach
that would allow courts of appeals to determine, case-by-case,
whether to allow an appeal before a final judgment.2 But it was
not long before the Supreme Court retreated from Gillespie, cabining the decision to its facts,3 and the Court nowadays adamantly rejects ad hoc balancing in appellate jurisdiction.' With the
seeming death of Gillespie came the conventional wisdom that the
balancing approach to appellate jurisdiction had died as well;'
* Assistant Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. My thanks to Pauline Kim,
Ken Kilbert (who gets extra thanks and credit for the title), Liz McCuskey, James E.
Pfander, and Michael Solimine, and to participants in the Ninth Annual Junior Faculty
Federal Courts Workshop, the 2015 Central States Law Schools Scholarship Conference,
and the University of Toledo College of Law faculty roundtable. Thanks also to the University of Toledo College of Law for providing summer funding for this project. And special
thanks to Nicole Porter.
1. 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
2. See generally Martin H. Redish, The PragmaticApproach to Appealability in the
Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89 (1975) (discussing the potential of a balancing approach to appellate jurisdiction).
3. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995) ("We of course decide appealability for categories of orders rather than individual orders. Thus, we do not now in each
individual case engage in ad hoc balancing to decide issues of appealability.").
5. See, e.g., 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3913 (2d ed. 1992).
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modern accounts regard the case as essentially overruled and reject the balancing approach as a valid source of appellate jurisdiction.' The balancing approach accordingly receives little attention
in the literature, primarily mentioned (if at all) as a historical
aside.
But the balancing approach is not quite dead. It instead persists in a variety of contexts addressed largely (and sometimes
entirely) in the decisions of the courts of appeals. In these contexts, courts have followed and continue to follow Gillespie's legacy of taking a practical and not technical approach to appellate
jurisdiction. And in these contexts, decisions are rife with caseby-case decisions on whether to hear an interlocutory appeal,
seemingly in defiance of the Supreme Court's rejection of such ad
hoc balancing.
In this article, I survey five areas in which the balancing approach persists in the courts of appeals: administrative remands,
post-judgment appeals, the ministerial/technical exception, cumulative finality, and pure pragmatic appeals. Each of these areas
has received little academic attention, but each of these areas
continue to bear the influence of Gillespie and the balancing approach. This survey thus reveals that the conventional wisdom
about Gillespie-and the balancing approach to appellate jurisdiction more generally-is wrong.

6. See 19 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 202.10 (3d ed. 2016); ERIC J. MAGNUSON &
DAVID F. HERR, FEDERAL APPEALS § 2.3, at 53 (2015); 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, at
479; Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:DiscretionaryReview of Interlocutory
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 205-06 (2001); Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony
of Appellate Jurisdiction,62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 371 (2010); Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1183 n.97
(1990); see also Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV.
1237, 1247 n.76 (2007) ("The current viability of Gillespie's balancing approach has been
repeatedly questioned."); Thomas E. Baker, Toward a Unified Theory of the Jurisdictionof
the United States Courts of Appeals, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 235, 268 (1990) (describing the
balancing approach as "moribund but susceptible to some future revitalization"). I have
myself repeated the conventional wisdom that Gillespie and the balancing approach are no
longer a valid basis for appellate jurisdiction. See Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and
Experimentationin Appellate Jurisdiction,74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 429 n.26 (2013) [hereinafter Lammon, Rules, Standards,and Experimentation]. But see Bryan Lammon, Perlman
Appeals After Mohawk, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2016) [hereinafter Lammon, Perlman
Appeals] (noting that appeals under the balancing approach still crop up).
7. See, e.g., Petty, supranote 6, at 371.
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The persistence of the balancing approach raises difficult questions for interlocutory appeal reform, which is the focus of most
appellate jurisdiction literature. The current system of interlocutory appeals is largely regarded as a mess,' and calls for reform
have persisted for decades! If reform is to happen, it will likely
take the form of categorical rules." But the balancing approach's
persistence-in the face of the Supreme Court seemingly burying

8. Lammon, Rules, Standards,and Experimentation, supra note 6, at 423; Steinman,
supra note 6, at 1238-39.
9. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New "Serbonian
Bog" and FourProposalsfor Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 606-14 (1998); Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., The Final Judgment Rule and PartyAppeals of Civil Contempt Orders: Time for a
Change, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1041, 1080-84, 1108 (1980); Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 166-70 (1984); Edward
H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 157, 163-64 (1984); Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal,
41 YALE L.J. 539, 563-65 (1932); Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary
Appellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 285, 293-302 (1999); Kristin B. Gerdy, "Important"and "Irreversible"but Maybe
Not "Unreviewable" The Dilemma of ProtectingDefendants'Rights Through the Collateral
Order Doctrine, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 213, 256-60 (2004); Glynn, supra note 6, at 258-67;
Kenneth K. Kilbert, Instant Replay and InterlocutoryAppeals (July 31, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (draft on file with author); Lawyers Conference Comm. on Fed. Courts & the
Judiciary, The FinalityRule: A Proposalfor Change, 19 JUDGES' J., 33, 35-38 (1980); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem,
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 748-87 (1993); Petty, supra note 6, at 393-405;
James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by Agreement of the
Parties:A PreliminaryAnalysis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1043, 1058-81 (2011); Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b): Seventy-Five and Ready for Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711, 760
(2013) [hereinafter Pollis, Rule 54(b)]; Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary
Interlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643,
1685-93 (2011) [hereinafter Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation]; Cedric W. Porter, Appeals
from Interlocutory and FinalDecrees in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, 19 B.U.
L. REV. 377, 411-12 (1939); Redish, supra note 2, at 124-27; Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 777-85 (2006); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: A Comment on Martineau's "RightProblem,
Wrong Solution," 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 797-803 (1993); Michael E. Solomine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certificationand Interlocutory Review
by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531,
1562-72 (2000); Solimine, supra note 6, at 1201-03; Steinman, supra note 6, at 1276-94;
Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure:Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 584-602 (2002); Brad D. Feldman,
Note, An Appeal for Immediate Appealability: Applying the Collateral Order Doctrine to
Orders Denying Appointed Counsel in Civil Rights Cases, 99 GEO. L.J. 1717, 1739-44
(2011); Theodore D. Frank, Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L.
REV. 292, 320 (1966); Michael W. McConnell, Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualificationof Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 450,
481-82 (1978); John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals
Jurisprudencewith DiscretionaryReview, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 214-22 (1994).
10. See Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 6, at 25.
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it-suggests that appellate judges cannot resist approaching their
jurisdiction with some flexibility. And this flexibility threatens to
undermine the certainty, predictability, and ease of application of
any categorical rules. To address this threat, I suggest an approach to interlocutory appeal reform modeled on the hearsay
rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence: categorical rules coupled
with a discretionary catchall. This proposal is, by necessity, preliminary and will be developed further in future scholarship. But
this article provides the potential structure for reform and a
starting point for adding content to that structure.
In Part I, I provide necessary background on the current regime of federal appellate jurisdiction before turning to the rise
and fall of Gillespie and the balancing approach. Part I concludes
by explaining how inconsistent Gillespie and the balancing approach are with the Supreme Court's current approach to appellate jurisdiction. Part II turns to five areas in which the balancing
approach persists in the courts of appeals and demonstrates the
influence of the balancing approach, and the often case-by-case
nature of decision-making, in each of these areas. And in Part III,
I explore the implications of the balancing approach's persistence
for the major focus of the interlocutory appeals literaturereform. I explain how this persistence suggests that appellate
judges cannot resist using some flexibility in defining their jurisdiction. I conclude with a preliminary suggestion of how to account for flexibility's allure: a jurisdictional regime that mixes
categorical rules and discretion.
I. THE FINAL-JUDGMENT RULE AND GILLESPIE

A. Appeals Before a Final Judgment
District court judges often decide a number of issues in the
course of litigation.11 Nearly all of these decisions are "interlocutory"-they're made at some point before a final judgment and
leave other issues for later resolution. As a general rule, federal
litigants must wait until the end of proceedings in the district
court-when all issues have been decided and all that remains is

11.

I have adapted much of this section's introductory material from Lammon, Rules,

Standards,and Experimentation, supra note 6, at 428-31.
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enforcing the judgment-before appealing any one of those interlocutory orders.1 2 This limit on federal appellate jurisdiction is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and commonly called the "finaljudgment rule."13
The final-judgment rule is thought to strike the general balance between the conflicting interests in appellate reviewefficiency and error correction. The efficiency benefits are obvious: district court proceedings are free from appellate interruption, appellate judges generally address a case only once, litigants
are saved the cost and potential harassment of multiple appeals,
and interlocutory appeals that might eventually become unnecessary-say, because the aggrieved party ultimately prevails at trial-are avoided." But the final-judgment rule also has costs. Appellate decisions can develop unclear areas of the law and correct
errors. Appellate intervention can speed along trial court proceedings and cut short what would later be deemed unnecessary litigation. And the delay between an erroneous district court decision and vindication on appeal can cause substantial, sometimes
irreparable, harms.6
By generally postponing appeal until the end of district court
proceedings, the final-judgment rule reflects a belief that in most
cases the benefits of delaying appeal outweigh the costs.17 But like
most rules, the final-judgment rule strikes that balance only generally. Sometimes the balance shifts because the need for imme12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) ("The courts of appeals (other than the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for
the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."); Catlin v.
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining a "final decision" as one that "ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment").
13. See, e.g., Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 543 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977); see also Petty, supra note 6,
at 356-60 (discussing the final-judgment rule's history).
14. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 805 (8th ed. 2010).
15. E.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987).
16. For example, parties who cannot obtain immediate review of an interlocutory district court order might feel compelled to abandon or settle a case--even if they would have
won on appeal-rather than bear the costs of discovery and trial.
17. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3911.2 ("The final judgment rule... rests
on a rough calculation that ordinarily the balance between the values of immediate appeal
and delayed appeal swings in favor of deferring appeal.").
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diate review outweighs (or is at least thought to outweigh) the
loss in efficiency. Sometimes it can even be more efficientsystematically speaking-to allow interlocutory appeals.'
So the final-judgment rule has exceptions. In fact, it has many
exceptions.19 Some are found in statutes.0 Others in rules.21 And
still others come from judicial decisions.2
The current regime of federal appellate jurisdiction-with a
general final-judgment rule and a slew of exceptions-has been
extensively discussed and critiqued elsewhere.22 This topic will be

18. Arguments for a system of discretionary appeals often make this point. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 9, at 301-02. I have argued elsewhere that this is an
entirely plausible argument. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation, supra
note 6, at 434. But it is one for which the opposite argument-that discretionary appeals
would be overall less efficient-is similarly plausible. See id. The point is that we do not
know (and likely cannot know) which argument is more accurate without trying a system
of discretionary appeals out. The same goes for many arguments about the likely effects of
any change to the system of interlocutory appeals. See id. at 432-36.
19. For a more in-depth discussion of the exceptions to the final-judgment rule, see
Glynn, supra note 6, at 182-201; Martineau, supra note 9, at 729-47; Petty, supra note 6,
at 360-93; Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation,supra note 9, at 1652-59; Steinman, supra note
6, at 1244-72.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), for example, gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over
appeals from "[i]nterlocutory orders ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(2012). The Federal Arbitration Act permits immediate appeals from interlocutory orders
involving arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)-(2) (2012). And a district court can certify an
interlocutory order for immediate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) so long as the order
involves "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and ...an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance...
the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012).
21. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) allows for immediate appeals from district
court orders granting or denying class certification. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). And Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(b) authorizes a district court to enter a final judgment for some (but
not all) of the claims or parties in a case "if the court expressly determines that there is no
just reason for delay," thereby allowing an immediate appeal from orders that would otherwise have to wait for a final judgment. FED. R. CI. P. 54(b).
22. The major judge-made exception to the final-judgment rule is the collateral order
doctrine. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation,supra note 6, at 431 (calling the collateral order doctrine "the most common and most maligned exception to the
final judgment rule"). Although the exact requirements of that doctrine can vary from case
to case, it generally allows immediate appeals from types of orders that are conclusively
decided in the district court, separate from the merits of the trial court proceedings, and
effectively unreviewable after a final judgment. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558
U.S. 100, 106 (2009); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). For a discussion of whether these are properly considered "exceptions" to the final judgment rule
(which I think they are), see Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supranote 6, at 27-28; Lammon,
Rules, Standards,and Experimentation,supra note 6, at 447 n.118.
23. See generally 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, §§ 3901-44; Glynn, supra note 6;
Martineau, supra note 9; Petty, supra note 6; Steinman, supra note 6.
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addressed later. The immediate discussion focuses on one of the
less studied judge-made exceptions to the final-judgment rulethe balancing approach.
B. The BalancingApproach to Appealability
The balancing approach has gone by a variety of names in the
caselaw and literature-e.g., practical finality, pragmatic finality,
marginal finality, even "the twilight zone doctrine."24 And although its exact contours are not defined, the balancing approach
essentially entails a case-by-case approach to appellate jurisdiction, with courts engaging in ad hoc, pragmatic balancing of the
costs and benefits of an immediate appeal in each case.25
As a preliminary note, singling out one judge-made exception
to the final-judgment rule as the balancing approach is a bit misleading. As just mentioned, the final-judgment rule itself strikes
a balance of the interests between immediate review and delaying
appeals. And many of the exceptions to the final-judgment rule
involve similar balancing.26 Consider, for example, the most common judge-made exception: the collateral order doctrine. Simplifying a bit, that doctrine allows for appeals from orders that are
(1) conclusive, (2) separate from the merits, and (3) effectively unreviewable on appeal.27 Each of these requirements addresses
some of the interests that must be balanced when determining
the timing of appeals. A district court decision that is not conclusive, for example, could be revisited-and reversed-as litigation
proceeds, and any revisiting could obviate the need for an appeal.
Appeal of an order that is separate from the merits is less likely
to interfere with (and thus slow down) proceedings in the district

24. See, e.g., Stubblefield v. Windsor Capital Grp., 74 F.3d 990, 996 (10th Cir. 1996)
("marginal finality"); Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 1089, 1094 (10th Cir.
1995) ("practical finality"); Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d
399, 401 (5th Cir. 1984) ("pragmatic finality"); 19 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
6, § 202.10 ("pragmatic finality doctrine"); 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3913
("pragmatic finality"); Petty, supra note 6, at 368 ("practical finality"); Baker, supranote 6,
at 268 ("the twilight zone doctrine"); see also New Mexico v. Trujillo, 813 F.3d 1308, 1317
(10th Cir. 2016) ("The pragmatic finality doctrine-also referred to as the practical finality
doctrine, the Gillespie doctrine, and the twilight zone doctrine-is an exception to the formal finality requirement of § 1291.").
25. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3913; Petty, supra note 6, at 371.
26. See Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 9, at 1649-51.
27. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:371

court. And if an order is "effectively unreviewable" on appeal from
a final judgment, the need for immediate appellate review is
much stronger; otherwise the order might never be reviewed by
an appellate court.
Other, non-judge-created exceptions to the final-judgment rule
also entail balancing. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), for
example, gives the courts of appeals discretion to immediately review district court orders granting or denying class certification.28
This is a context in which the benefits of an immediate appeal are
especially great. The district court's decision on class certification
is often the main event in class litigation-if the class is certified,
the risk of an immense adverse money judgment often forces defendants to settle; if class certification is denied, the stakes are
often too low to make the non-class suit financially viable and the
claims are often abandoned.2 9 In either of these two situationssettlement or abandonment-there is no chance for appellate review. If class certification decisions are ever going to be reviewed,
they generally must be reviewed immediately. ° Since the benefits
of an immediate appeal are especially great in this context, Rule
23(f) gives the courts of appeals discretion to review interlocutory
orders on class certification.
Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) allows district courts to certify
an interlocutory order for immediate review. If the district court
does so, the court of appeals then has discretion to immediately
hear the appeal.31 Section 1292(b) directs district courts to certify
an order when there exist substantial grounds for disagreement
and an immediate appeal would accelerate resolution of district
court proceedings.3 2 These two criteria capture situations in which
the balance of costs and benefits in appeal timing have shifted. If
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(o. For an in-depth discussion of Rule 23(f), see generally Solimine & Hines, supra note 9.
29. See Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999).
30. See id. at 834-35.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). For more on section 1292(b), see generally Alexandra B. Hess, Stephanie L. Parker & Tala K. Toufanian, Permissive Interlocutory Appeals
at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995-2010), 60
AM. U. L. REV. 757 (2011); Solimine, supra note 6; Tory Weigand, DiscretionaryInterlocutory Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): A First Circuit Survey and Review, 19 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 183 (2014); Mackenzie M. Horton. Note, Mandamus, Stop in the
Name of Discretion: The Judicial "Myth" of the District Court's Absolute and Unreviewable
Discretion in Section 1292(b) Certification,64 BAYLOR L. REV. 976 (2012).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012).
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substantial grounds for disagreement exist, there is a better
chance that the district court's order will be reversed and thus a
greater need for mid-course correction. Immediate review can
stave off what would turn out to be wasteful litigation that proceeded under the district court's erroneous ruling. And if immediate review would facilitate earlier resolution of district court proceedings (often through dismissal or settlement), the benefits of
immediate review are greater than normal. Similarly, the costs of
an immediate appeal are less in the section 1292(b) context; the
district court has certified the order for appeal and thus lessened
concerns about the appeal interfering with the district court's
management of the case.
These exceptions to the final-judgment rule (and others) reflect
a balancing of interests in appellate jurisdiction. But the distinct
"balancing approach" to appellate jurisdiction is something different. Most exceptions to the final-judgment rule are categorical
rules or have some clear basis in the statutes and rules governing
appellate jurisdiction. By categorical, I mean that the exceptions
define classes or types of orders that are immediately appealable.
Most of those that are not categorical-such as Rule 54(b) and the
just-discussed section 1292(b)-come from congressionally approved statutes or rules. Rule 23(f) meets both of these criteria.
The balancing approach, in contrast, meets neither. It encompasses case-by-case determinations of appellate jurisdiction,
made by balancing the costs and benefits of an immediate appeal
in the individual case. Few rules or doctrines for later cases are
laid down. Instead, the balancing approach essentially gives the
courts of appeals discretion over whether to hear an immediate
appeal in any case. And there is little statutory basis for the balancing approach; nowadays most courts and commentators deem
this approach antithetical to section 1291 and the final-judgment
rule.
The balancing approach stems primarily from a Supreme Court
decision in which the Court came as close as it ever has to endorsing an ad hoc balancing approach to appellate jurisdiction: Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp.33

33.

379 U.S. 148 (1964).
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C. Gillespie and the BalancingApproach
Daniel Gillespie drowned while working aboard a ship owned
by U.S. Steel. 4 His mother Mabel sued U.S. Steel, claiming damages under the Jones Act (the federal law under which the survivors of seamen can seek recovery), an Ohio wrongful death statute, and the common law." The district court dismissed all but
the Jones Act claim, concluding that the Act provided the sole
remedy in this situation and preempted the other claims.3" Although the mother's Jones Act claim remained pending in the district court, she immediately appealed the dismissal of her other
claims.37 The court of appeals avoided answering the question of
appellate jurisdiction and decided the case on its merits." The
Supreme Court, however, squarely addressed the jurisdiction issue.
The Court began by noting that its cases "long have recognized
that whether a ruling is 'final' within the meaning of § 1291 is
frequently so close a question that decision of the issue either way
can be supported with equally forceful arguments."3 9 It was thus
"impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what might be called the 'twilight zone' of finality,"
and the Court had accordingly "held that the requirement of finality is to be given a 'practical rather than a technical construction."'40 And "in deciding the question of finality the most important competing considerations are 'the inconvenience and
costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other."''
Turning to the facts of Gillespie, the Supreme Court recognized
that the case posed some risk of multiple appeals-one addressing whether the Jones Act was the exclusive remedy and another

34. Id. at 149-50.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 150.
37. Id. at 151.
38. Id. at 151-52; see also Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518, 522 (6th Cir.
1963).
39. 379 U.S. at 152.
40. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
41. Id. at 152-53 (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507,
511 (1950)).
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on the merits after a final judgment.4 2 But the Court thought the
cost of multiple appeals in this case would not be great (though it
did not explain why),43 and deciding the question immediately
would avoid wasting all the time and effort put into appealing the
case all the way to the Supreme Court." Perhaps more importantly, the Court deemed the questions presented in the appeal "fundamental to the further conduct of the case." And although there
had been no section 1292(b) certification, the Court concluded
that "treating this obviously marginal case as final and appealable" would "implement[] the same policy Congress sought to promote in § 1292(b).""
Gillespie-inboth its broad statements and its specific application-is pretty unique among the Court's finality decisions. The
order was not separate from or collateral to the merits; whether
Gillespie's mother could bring her state and common-law claims
were instead part of the merits. The order involved was not effectively unreviewable after a final judgment; an appellate court
could have waited for decision on the Jones Act claim and then
decided all issues in a single appeal. (Granted, a reversal might
have required an additional trial, which would impose some costs
on the district court and the parties. But those costs are little different from the types of costs that courts have routinely deemed
insufficient to merit an immediate appeal).
The Court was left only with the costs and benefits of an immediate appeal in the case before it. And that is all it relied on in
finding jurisdiction. The Court weighed the costs of allowing immediate review (primarily the chance of multiple appeals) versus
the benefits (primarily answering a question "fundamental" to the
case). It concluded that the benefits outweighed the costs. Notably, the Supreme Court did not make any sort of categorical
judgment and did not suggest that some (or all) partial dismissals

42. See id. at 152-53, 156 ("It is true that the review of this case by the Court of Appeals could be called 'piecemeal."').
43. See id. at 153 ("[I]t does not appear that the inconvenience and cost of trying this
case will be greater because the Court of Appeals decided the issues raised instead of compelling the parties to go to trial with them unanswered.").
44. See id. ("And it seems clear now that the case is before us that the eventual costs,
as all the parties recognize, will certainly be less if we now pass on the questions presented here rather than send the case back with those issues undecided.").
45. Id. at 154.
46. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:371

were henceforth immediately appealable. It instead looked only to
the present circumstances, without any evident regard to the systematic effects of allowing the appeal.
Gillespie crystalized the balancing approach to appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.47 And it appeared to open the door
to a more widespread balancing approach to defining appellate
jurisdiction.48 In the years immediately following Gillespie, courts
of appeals often invoked the Court's instruction to take a practical, not technical, approach to appellate jurisdiction.49 Indeed, the
Gillespie decision came to embody the balancing approach; courts
and commentators often regarded them as one in the same, with
Gillespie providing the balancing approach's source, definition,
and limitations. 0
But Gillespie did not live a long life. In Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, the Court held that denials of class certification were not
immediately appealable orders.51 And in so doing, the Supreme
Court appeared to sharply limit Gillespie's reach. In response to
the argument that Gillespie supported jurisdiction over denials of
class certification, the Court emphasized Gillespie's "unique
facts": the order in Gillespie was "marginally final" and "disposed
of an unsettled issue of national significance"; immediate review
"implemented the same policy Congress sought to promote in
§ 1292(b)"; and the question of appellate jurisdiction "had not
been presented to [the] Court until argument on the merits,"
meaning that a dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
would have meant all the time and effort spent appealing the case
were wasted.52 The Supreme Court concluded that any extension

47. See Redish, supra note 2, at 116 ("[It was not until Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp.... that the pragmatic balancing approach can arguably be said to have received the
[Supreme] Court's endorsement.").
48. Id. at 119.
49. See, e.g., Joseph F. Hughes & Co. v. United Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 390 F.2d
629, 630 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Mid-Continent
Life Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 389, 391 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102,
105 (5th Cir. 1967); Kelly v. Greer, 354 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1965).
50. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Trujillo, 813 F.3d 1308, 1317 (10th Cir. 2016) (calling the
balancing approach the "Gillespie doctrine" (among other things)); 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3913; Steinman, supra note 6, at 1247 n.76.
51. 437 U.S. 463, 465 (1978).
52. Id. at 477 n.30.
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of Gillespie beyond its "unique facts" would effectively nullify the
final-judgment rule. 3
Conventional wisdom soon became that Coopers & Lybrand
closed the door on the balancing approach. Federal Practice and
Procedure (a leading authority on federal appellate jurisdiction)
reads Coopers & Lybrand as distinguishing Gillespie "on grounds
that seem to bury it quietly." 4 Moore's FederalPractice similarly
states that the Court "has severely restricted [Gillespie's] scope,
limiting its application to the unique facts that gave rise to the
doctrine."5 Modern discussions of appellate jurisdiction (mine included) repeat the accepted belief of Gillespie's death. The Supreme Court has not cited Gillespie for twenty years (and then it
was only for Gillespie's Jones Act holding). 7
With Gillespie's death came the apparent death of the balancing approach. By most accounts, little ever became of it. Federal
Practice and Procedure suggests that the approach has had little
influence, as many of the decisions that rely on it "could be justified on other grounds."58 And the "benign neglect" that the decision has received in the caselaw and literature is, according to
that treatise, "fully warranted."5 Along these lines, several judicial decisions have stated that Gillespie and the balancing approach are no longer a sound basis for appellate jurisdiction.65 The

53. Id.
54. 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3913.
55. 19 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 202.10.
56. See MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 6, § 2:3, at 53; Glynn, supra note 6, at 205-06;
Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation,supra note 6, at 429 n.26; Petty, supra
note 6, at 371; Solimine, supra note 6, at 1183 n.97; see also Baker, supra note 6, at 268
(describing the balancing approach as "moribund but susceptible to some future revitalization"); Steinman, supra note 6, at 1247 n.76 ("The current viability of Gillespie'sbalancing
approach has been repeatedly questioned.").
57. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 212 (1996). A few postCoopers & Lybrand citations for Gillespie's jurisdictional holding have concerned the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review state court decisions. See Am. Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 277, 279 (1980). And a few dissents from the denial of certiorari have
cited Gillespie's jurisdictional holding to support an argument for hearing a case of questionable finality. See Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965, 966-67 (1992)
(White, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Michael v. United States, 454 U.S.
950, 951-52 (1981) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
58. 15A WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 5, § 3913.
59. Id.
60. See, e:g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 922 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the
Supreme Court had "rejected the view that Gillespie permits the court to decide close cases
of finality by an ad hoc balancing"); Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree,
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balancing approach has accordingly received little in-depth attention over the past several decades.
Indeed, Gillespie and the balancing approach run contrary to
the Supreme Court's current views on judge-made exceptions to
the final-judgment rule. The Supreme Court has now squarely
disavowed any ad hoc, case-by-case approaches to appellate jurisdiction. 6 In the context of the collateral order doctrine, for example, the Court has repeatedly stated that decisions are to be made
categorically-a particular type of order is either always appealable or never is. 2 And in one recent decision on the final-judgment
rule Mohawk Industries,Inc. v. Carpenter-theCourt suggested
that judge-made exceptions are out and rulemaking is in.6 Rulemaking, the Mohawk Court noted, "draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, and it facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions."64 Most have read Mohawk as
discouraging any more judge-made exceptions to the finaljudgment rule, if not foreclosing them altogether. And so rulemaking-"not expansion by court decision"-is now "the preferred
means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders
should be immediately appealable."6

723 F.2d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (calling the balancing approach "in fundamental conflict with the values and purposes of the finality rule to avoid the delay and systemcosts of piecemeal and multiple appeals, and to provide a relatively clear test of appealability so that needless precautionary appeals not be taken").
61. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995).
62. See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198, 206 (1999); Johnson, 515 U.S. at
315; Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994).
63. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113-14 (2009).
64. Id. at 114 (internal citation omitted).
65. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Keeps Tight Limits on Interlocutory Review, 46
TRIAL 52, 54 (2010) ("[Mohawk] shows that little, if anything, will be found to fit within
the collateral order exception that the Court recognized in Cohen."); James E. Pfander,
Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in ConstitutionalLitigation, 114 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1387, 1404 (2010) ("[Tlhe Court [in Mohawk] ... suggested that it would no longer
adopt judge-made expansions of the collateral order doctrine."); Pfander & Krohn, supra
note 9, at 1053; Rory Ryan, Luke Meier & Jeremy Counseller, Interlocutory Review of Orders Denying Remand Motions, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 734, 776 (2011) (suggesting that after
Mohawk, "little room exists for the [collateral order] doctrine's expansion"). But see Scott
Dodson, The Complexity of JurisdictionalClarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 42 (2011) ("[T]he Court
[in Mohawk] has left open the possibility that other nonfinal decisions might be deemed to
be final.").
66. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 113 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35,
48 (1995)).
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The conventional wisdom is thus that Gillespie and the balancing approach-with their ad hoc, judge-crafted exceptions to the
final-judgment rule-are no longer relevant to modern appellate
jurisdiction. The balancing approach to appellate jurisdiction, in
other words, is dead.
II. PRAGMATIC APPEALS AND PRACTICAL FINALITY
But the balancing approach is not dead yet. It instead persists
in several doctrines that exist primarily-often entirely-in the
courts of appeals. These doctrines were built atop Gillespie and
the balancing approach. Their early decisions invoked the hallmarks of balancing-the need to take a practical, not technical,
approach to appellate jurisdiction. They regularly involve a casespecific balancing of the costs and benefits of immediate review.
And despite Gillespie-the foundation on which these doctrines
were built-having been seemingly limited to its facts, courts continue to apply them. The reports of the balancing approach's
death have accordingly been exaggerated.
With most everyone thinking that the balancing approach is a
thing of the past, its persistence has been given short shrift in the
literature. Even courts are not always obvious in their use of the
balancing approach. But a bit of unpacking reveals courts wielding the balancing approach in one of two ways.
The first is what I call "pragmatic appeals." Pragmatic appeals
occur when a court of appeals reviews an indisputably non-final
order because the benefits of doing so are especially great. These
are appeals from orders that are nowhere near a traditional final
judgment; important issues remain pending, and the litigation is
far from over. Unlike the more established exceptions to the finaljudgment rule, these appeals often involve issues central torather than collateral to-the litigation. In cases of pragmatic appeals the costs of allowing an immediate review are often largely
the same. But what distinguishes these cases is that the benefits
of allowing immediate review are substantially greater than normal. Pragmatic appeals thus present a situation in which the
court finds an especially good reason to hear an immediate appeal.
Second is "practical finality." Practical finality, like pragmatic
appeals, involve what are technically non-final orders. But in instances of practical finality, district court proceedings are essen-
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tially done. That is, the district court has not entered a traditional final order, but it has more-or-less finished with the case, and
there is nothing left for the district court to do that is of much
significance. The key characteristic of practical finality is that the
normal costs of allowing an immediate appeal are minimized
while the benefits remain the same. In cases of practical finality,
then, the court finds no good reason to wait for a traditional final
judgment.
The line between pragmatic appeals and practical finality is
not always a bright one; it is a matter of judgment to say that a
case is close enough to the finish line to be an instance of practical finality rather than a pragmatic appeal. And in some instances, both costs and benefits shift; post-judgment appeals (as discussed below) are one context in which the benefits of an
immediate appeal are often greater than normal and the costs are
often lower. The important point, however, is the visible influence
of the balancing approach.
In this part, I survey five instances in which the balancing approach survives in the courts of appeals: administrative remands,
post-judgment appeals, the ministerial/technical exception, cumulative finality, and pure pragmatic appeals. Gillespie and the balancing approach influenced the law's development in each of these areas, and that influence can still be seen in modern cases.
This survey reveals that the balancing approach persists in the
courts of appeals despite its seeming death and burial in the Supreme Court. I turn to the implications of this discovery in Part
III.
A. Administrative Remands
First is the administrative-remand rule. This doctrine addresses a problem that sometimes arises in district court review of administrative agency adjudication. Many administrative adjudications can be reviewed in federal district courts.67 And it is not
uncommon for district courts to remand cases back to the agency
for further proceedings.

67.

See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
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These remand orders are not final in the traditional sense of
the word; more remains to be done in the agency. And in many
cases, immediate review of the remand order could both disrupt
administrative proceedings (they might be stayed during the appeal) and lead to piecemeal review (the court of appeals might
hear a case twice-once after the administrative remand and
again after any further administrative proceedings). Delaying review, in contrast, would consolidate all issues-issues from both
the earlier agency action and the later agency action-into one
appeal. Therefore, the general rule is that a district court order
remanding a case to an agency for further proceedings is not a final, appealable order.68
Sometimes courts have held that a particular case requires an
exception to this general rule. Courts have developed the administrative-remand exception to the final-judgment rule.69 This exception applies primarily when the lack of an immediate appeal
from an administrative remand might leave a party (most commonly the government) without any chance for appellate review.
The administrative-remand exception allows parties to immediately appeal an administrative-remand when the benefits of doing so are especially great. Less commonly, courts have allowed
an immediate appeal from an administrative remand when the
costs of doing so were especially low. And the balancing approach
has played a central role in this exception's development."

68. See N.C. Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 550 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("It is
black letter law that a district court's remand order is not normally 'final' for purposes of
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291."); see also, e.g., Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins.
Corp., 731 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bhd. of Maint. Way Emps. v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 864 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1988)); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 716 F.3d 653,
656 (D.C. Cir. 2013); W. Energy All. v. Salazar, 709 F.3d 1040, 1048-49 (10th Cir. 2013);
Hanauer v. Reich, 82 F.2d 1304, 1306 (4th Cir. 1996); Perales v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1348,
1353 (2d Cir. 1991); Crowder v. Sullivan, 897 F.2d 252, 252 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam);
Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1990); Mall Prop., Inc. v.
Marsh, 841 F.2d 440, 441 (1st Cir. 1988); Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1426-27 (10th
Cir. 1984); 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3914.32 ("The general rule is that a remand
[to an administrative agency] is not appealable as a final decision."). Cf. Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Corp., 501 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying a similar
rule to an order remanding a benefits determination to an ERISA plan administrator).
69. FederalPracticeand Procedure briefly discusses this aspect of appeals in administrative-review cases, though it does not note the balancing approach's influence. See 15B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3914.32.
70. See Graham, 501 F.3d at 1158 (questioning whether Gillespie's pragmatic balancing approach to appeals-which the court calls "practical finality"-is still a proper source
of appellate jurisdiction but noting that it "is more robust in the context of agency re-
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On a somewhat superficial level, several of the early decisions
developing the rule invoked the hallmarks of the balancing approach. They often quoted Gillespie's instruction to give finality
"a practical rather than technical construction.,, 71 And they described their task as "requir[ing] some evaluation of the competing considerations underlying all finality-the inconvenience and
costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other. '72 Their task required, in other
words, case-by-case balancing. 3
More importantly, the rule itself reflects pragmatic balancing.
As just mentioned, the costs and benefits of an immediate appeal
in a run-of-the-mill administrative-remand case are little different than those in a normal case. The administrative-remand exception addresses some situations in which the balance of costs
and benefits has shifted.
Consider the scenario in which the administrative-remand exception most commonly applies: cases in which an administrativeremand might leave the government with no opportunity to obtain appellate review. Assume that someone makes a claim of
benefits to a government agency, but the agency rejects the claim.
When the claimant seeks review in the district court, that court
determines that the agency used the wrong legal standard and
remands for further proceedings. If, in applying the new legal
standard, the agency awards the claimant benefits, the government generally will not be able to appeal; agencies normally cannot appeal their own determination. So the remand risks making
the district court's holding on the proper legal standard unreviewable by a court of appeals.

view").
71. See Stone v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Gillespie v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964)); Gueory v. Hampton, 510 F.2d 1222, 1225 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (quoting Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152).
72. Stone, 722 F.2d at 467 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171
(1974)).
73. Some courts have suggested that the administrative-remand rule is an application
of the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Borntrager v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087, 1092 (8th Cir. 2005). I disagree. As mentioned above, the collateral order doctrine applies only to orders that are separate from the merits. In administrative-remand cases, the issue being appealed is often the legal standard the agency should
apply, which is central to the merits. See Bender, 744 F.2d at 1427 (concluding that the
issues addressed in an appeal from an administrative remand were central-not collateral-to the merits; the collateral order doctrine was thus inapplicable).
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Faced with this situation, courts in most of the circuits have
concluded that the government can immediately appeal the district court's order, even though that order is not final.74 In this
situation, the costs of allowing an immediate appeal are little different than they normally are; an immediate appeal could interfere with the efficient adjudication of the administrative proceedings and could result in multiple appeals involving the same
dispute. But the benefits of an immediate review are much greater than normal. The main benefit of appellate review is error correction. Because delaying review in these cases could preclude
any review, the only opportunity to correct errors is through an
immediate appeal. Since the benefits of immediate review can be
especially great in these cases, the administrative-remand rule
allows for an immediate appeal."
Although the rule is sometimes stated categorically (e.g., the
government can immediately appeal "when the agency to which
the case is remanded seeks to appeal, and that agency would be
unable to appeal after the proceedings on remand"),76 the actual
decisions are often more nuanced. In Davies v. Johanns, for example, the Eighth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review a
district court order remanding a dispute to the Secretary of Agriculture for a reappraisal of the plaintiffs' land.7 7 Like many administrative-remand cases, the court noted the possibility that
the Secretary would not be able to appeal the district court's order if the plaintiffs prevailed before the agency. But the court also emphasized judicial economy-the court thought it wasteful to
dismiss the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the potentially dispositive issue had been fully briefed and argued. 9

74. See, e.g., Davies v. Johanns, 477 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 2007); Travis v. Sullivan,
985 F.2d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 1993); Perales v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1348, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991);
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Bender, 744
F.2d at 1427-28.
75. See Stone, 722 F.2d at 467 ("In deciding whether district court remand orders are
appealable, other courts have especially considered whether a holding of nonappealability
would effectively deprive the litigants of an opportunity to obtain review.").
76. Perales, 948 F.2d at 1353.
77. 477 F.3d at 971.
78. Id.
79. Id. ("[W]e observe that judicial economy would be ill-served by postponing consideration of the potentially dispositive and fully briefed and argued issue raised in this appeal.").
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The nuanced approach to administrative remands is most apparent in the Tenth Circuit, which allows appeals from an administrative remand only if the issue is important, the issue is urgent, and the benefits of an immediate appeal outweigh the
costs."0 Applying this approach, the Tenth Circuit held in Bender
v. Clark that the Bureau of Land Management could appeal from
a remand that ordered the agency to apply a preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard to determine whether land contained a
particular geologic structure.8 1 The Bureau had rejected a lease
application after the applicant failed to prove by "clear and definite" evidence that the land in question did not contain the structure.2 In the lease applicant's appeal, the court determined that
the case required a "balancing" approach that asked "whether the
danger of injustice by delaying appellate review outweighs the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review."83 The potential injustice of delay in Bender was especially great. The court thought
that the issue presented was especially important.8 4 And if the
lease applicant prevailed on remand, the Bureau would have no
way to seek review of the district court's decision; it could not appeal its own administrative decisions.8 5 Immediate appellate review was necessary to ensure any review, so the court held that it
had jurisdiction."
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit held in Western Energy Alliance
v. Salazar that it lacked jurisdiction to review a district court order remanding a dispute to the Bureau of Land Management for

80. See W. Energy All. v. Salazar, 709 F.3d 1040,1049-50 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1984) (concluding that an appeal from an
administrative remand required "the application of a balancing test")). The Tenth Circuit
employs a similar case-by-case approach to appeals from orders remanding a benefits determination to a plan administrator. See Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Corp.,
501 F.3d 1153, 1057 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The Tenth Circuit has declined to adopt a hardand-fast rule regarding whether a district court's order remanding a benefits determination to a plan administrator is final, and therefore appealable, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
'The decision should be made on a case-by-case basis applying well-settled principles governing final decisions."') (quoting Rekstad v. First Bank Sys., 238 F.3d 1259, 1263 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
81. 744 F.2d at 1425-28.
82. Id. at 1425-26.
83. Id. at 1427.
84. See id. at 1428 ("As admitted by both parties, the standard-of-proof issue is a serious and unsettled one in the federal oil and gas leasing area.").
85. Id.
86. Id.
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the Bureau to take action on the plaintiffs' lease applications.87
Unlike Bender, the appeal in Western Energy Alliance was
brought by the lease applicants, not the Bureau.88 The court reasoned that the applicants, if dissatisfied with the Bureau's subsequent actions, could seek additional judicial review in the district
court and on appeal.8 There was accordingly no urgency-that is,
no special benefit-for immediate review."
Decisions involving immediate appeals by private litigants especially illustrate the administrative-remand exception's case-bycase nature. Unlike the government-which normally can appeal
an administrative-remand order due to the risk of otherwise never obtaining appellate review 1-private litigants generally cannot
appeal an administrative remand. 2 Private litigants (like those in
Western Energy Alliance) who are still aggrieved after further
proceedings can seek appellate review after those proceedings
have finished, so there is rarely any need for an immediate appeal. 3
Courts have sometimes found that the particularities of a case
require a different rule. In re Long-Distance Telephone Service
Federal Excise Tax Refund Litigation is one example. 4 Several
plaintiffs in that case challenged an IRS notice that established a
procedure for refunding illegally collected taxes. 5 The district
court eventually vacated the notice and remanded the case to the
agency, but it did not direct the agency to establish a new refund
policy. 6 The plaintiffs appealed, and the D.C. Circuit held that it
had jurisdiction under the administrative-remand rule. 7 Although the case was not final, the court noted that the IRS had
87.
88.
89.

709 F.3d 1040, 1042, 1051 (10th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1050.

90.

Id.

91. See, e.g., Bender, 744 F.2d at 1428.
92. See, e.g., W. Energy All., 709 F.3d at 1050.
93. See Alsea Valley All. v. Dep't of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004)
(while noting that "there may be circumstances that would afford a non-agency litigant
the ability to appeal a remand order," suggesting that the administrative-remand exception applied only to appeals by the government because only the government "face[s] the
unique prospect of being deprived of review altogether").
94. 751 F.3d 629 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
95. Id. at 631-32.
96. Id. at 632.
97. Id. at 633.
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"not taken any reviewable action in the two years since the district court's remand order.""8 Were the IRS to sit on its hands (as
it had some incentive to do), the dispute would never produce a
final, appealable order and review would be forever delayed. 9 Invoking Gillespie's endorsement of a "practical approach" to finality, the court deemed the order appealable. 0 0
Another example is Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, in which
the Ninth Circuit permitted private litigants to immediately appeal an administrative remand.' In Sierra Forest Legacy, several
environmental groups and the state of California challenged some
federal foresting guidelines on several grounds but had been
largely unsuccessful; the district court held that the government
had failed only to adequately consider alternative actions in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act.0 2 The district
court thus remanded the case to the Forest Service for a supplemental environmental impact study." 3 The Ninth Circuit nevertheless determined that it had jurisdiction over the environmental groups' appeal.0 4 The district court's order had left much of
the foresting guidelines in place, and the Forest Service had issued a draft impact study while the appeal was pending.' The
Ninth Circuit determined that both the district court's and the
agency's work was complete, even though the case wasprocedurally speaking-not over."'
Sierra Forest Legacy also illustrates the other side of the appellate-jurisdiction balance. In that case, the costs of an immediate
appeal were especially low-the work that would normally be
done before a final, appealable order was already complete, and
there was little left for the agency or the district court to do. Another example is Chang v. United States, in which the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review an order remanding a
dispute to the Immigration and Naturalization Service when re98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
agency

Id.
Id.
Id. at 633-34.
646 F.3d 1161, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1172-74.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1175-76.
Id. at 1176 ("As a practical matter, the work of both the district court and the
is complete.").
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mand would result in a "totally wasted proceeding."" 7 The district
court had remanded a lawful-permanent-residency petition to the
Service with directions to conduct an analysis that (according to
the Service) the Service was legally incapable of performing.'
Immediate review was not necessary to ensure any review, as the
government could later appeal the Service's decision. But the
Ninth Circuit determined that this "irrational" remand would
simply waste judicial resources and concluded that it had jurisdiction.19
The administrative-remand rule is thus one area in which the
influence of the balancing approach survives. And the doctrine exists entirely in the courts of appeals; the Supreme Court has decided only one marginally relevant case and has not squarely addressed the matter."0 The balancing approach's influence has
accordingly gone largely unnoticed.
B. Post-JudgmentAppeals
Post-judgment proceedings sometimes follow the main event of
litigation-that is, follow the determination of parties' rights.
These proceedings can take several forms. They can involve, for
example, a plaintiffs efforts to recover a judgment from a defendant by locating the defendant's assets."' Post-judgment proceedings can also involve a district court's ongoing supervision of an
injunction or consent decree. This is particularly common in institutional reform litigation, which often includes a protracted remedial phase during which the district court interprets and enforces an earlier order."2

107. 327 F.3d 911, 925 (9th Cir. 2003).
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also Stone v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The district
court's decision is adverse to the Secretary and, if wrong, would result in a totally wasted
proceeding below ....Deciding this legal issue now will promote the least possible waste
of judicial resources.").
110. See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625 (1990) (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) to permit an immediate appeal from some district court orders remanding a dispute to the Social Security Administration).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 69; see, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221,
1223 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing a plaintiff-creditor to initiate a post-judgment proceeding in
district court to collect judgments against defendant-debtor).
112. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Washing-
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Like normal, pre-judgment litigation, appellate jurisdiction in
post-judgment proceedings comes primarily from section 1291."'
So section 1291's normal finality principles apply-an appeal
generally cannot be taken until the end of post-judgment proceedings, when the district court has resolved all issues raised in
those proceedings.'1 4 But determining when those proceedings
have actually ended can prove troublesome.
In some cases, to be sure, the question is simple. Consider, for
example, an independent post-judgment proceeding brought to
collect a judgment; if the district court declines to enforce the
judgment, the post-judgment proceedings are over and the litigants can appeal."' Similarly, in a post-judgment proceeding to
enforce a consent decree regarding the distribution of a retirement plan's assets, the proceedings were final-and the district
court's orders appealable-once the district court had determined
how much each beneficiary of the plan would receive."'
Other cases are more difficult. Consider an order denying discovery of a debtor's assets in a post-judgment proceeding to collect
a judgment. Discovery orders are normally not immediately appealable. But the denial of discovery about a debtor's property can
spell the effective end of the pursuit of the debtor's propertywithout discovery, the creditor does not know what assets to attach."7 And once this discovery is denied, there is often little prospect that the district court will enter an additional order that
more resembles a final judgment. It is unclear, then, when that
discovery order could be appealed.
District courts' ongoing supervision of an injunction or consent
decree pose particular problems. These orders sometimes require
protracted efforts by one or more of the parties to comply with the
order. The injunction in Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, for example, required the state of California to reform prison practices and

ton, 761 F.2d 1404, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).
113. See, e.g., Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2004).
114. 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3916.
115. See, e.g., TDK Elec. Corp. v. Draiman, 321 F.3d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding
that a district court's refusal to revive an old judgment "end[ed] the Rule 69 proceeding,
the only matter on the docket, and thus finally disposes of the parties' dispute").
116. See, e.g., Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
117. See, e.g., Ohntrup v. Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 760 F.3d 290, 294 (3d
Cir. 2014).
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policies that violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause.1 1 The district
court issued the pertinent injunctions between 1999 and 2002;" 9
compliance efforts continue to this day. 2 ° Similarly, compliance
with the consent decree desegregating Chicago's public housing
has spanned decades."'
Identifying an end to these remedial proceedings can be impossible.122 Granted, full compliance with an injunction or decree
could create a close analogue to a final judgment; this can occur,
for example, in post-judgment proceedings overseeing the parties'
efforts to clean pollution from a contaminated site."' But an injunction or decree might have no expiration date, and even if
post-judgment proceedings will eventually end at some point, that
point might be so far in the future as to be unidentifiable at any
one point in the proceedings. In the meantime, district court's often issue a variety of orders-the parties often monitor each other's compliance with the injunction or consent decree, and when
the other side's efforts are lacking they turn to the district court
for enforcement." 4 The lack of a foreseeable final judgment raises
questions as to whether these interim orders can be appealed.
When a post-judgment appeal raises questions of appealability,
most courts of appeals have answered those questions by weighing the costs and benefits of an immediate appeal. The ad hoc
balancing approach that Gillespie epitomized has played a central
role in these cases.

118. 622 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010).
119. Id.
120. See Armstrong v. Brown, No. C942307CW (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 13, 2015).
121. See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951, 952 (7th Cir. 1999).
122. E.g., Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[W]here a consent decree serves as the 'first' order of the postjudgment controversy, the postjudgment proceedings may not bear sufficient similarities to a freestanding lawsuit to enable easy identification of a plausible counterpart to a final judgment as required under § 1291."); Bogard v.
Wright, 159 F.3d 1060, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1998) (presupposing "that the postjudgment proceeding is enough like a free-standing lawsuit to enable a plausible counterpart to the
conventional final judgment . . . fails when the decree is dealing with a consent decree
that.., has no termination date").
123. See, e.g., JMS Dev. Co. v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., 337 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that, in post-judgment proceedings overseeing the cleanup of polluted property,
the proceedings would not be final and appealable until the property was actually cleaned
and the costs of that cleanup were determined).
124. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d at 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Like administrative-remand appeals, the early cases in this area invoked the hallmarks of the balancing approach. These decisions regularly remarked that finality was to be decided practically. In United States v. McWhirter, for example, the Fifth Circuit
held that it had jurisdiction to review a district court's order
denying the government's request to issue interrogatories in postjudgment proceedings to recover on a default judgment. 125 Citing
Gillespie, the court noted that "[r]ecent decisions of the Supreme
Court have expanded the scope of final judgments beyond the limited class encompassed by the traditional rule, and have stressed
126
that the definition of a final judgment is a pragmatic one.' Similarly, in Plymouth Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Illinois MidContinent Life Insurance Co., the Third Circuit held that it had
jurisdiction to review a district court's order interpreting a settlement agreement. 127 In the course of reaching that conclusion,
the court noted Gillespie's teaching that "it is sometimes appropriate that the requirement of finality be given a practical rather
than a technical construction.', 2 The Sixth Circuit quoted the
same line from Gillespie in Joseph F. Hughes & Co. v. United
Plumbing & Heating,Inc., in which it held that it had jurisdiction
to review a district court's order garnishing a judgment-debtor's
tax refunds.'29
The modern cases also reflect the case-by-case balancing of Gillespie. Two aspects of that balancing merit mention. First, the
courts of appeals often are less concerned with the risks of piecemeal review in post-judgment appeals; the main event of litigation is complete and so any appeals will not interfere with it."0
Second, the courts often look to whether the appellant would have
any chance at review were immediate review denied; because of
the uncertainty as to when post-judgment proceedings will end,
125. 376 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1967).
126. Id.
127. 378 F.2d 389, 391 (3d Cir. 1967).
128. Id. (quoting Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964)).
129. 390 F.2d 629, 630 (6th Cir. 1968).
130. See, e.g., Miller v. Alamo, 975 F.2d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 1992) ("One reason [courts
are less concerned about piecemeal appeals in post-judgment proceedings] is that the underlying dispute has already been settled, and there is little danger that prompt appeal of
post-judgment matters will cause confusion, duplicative effort, or otherwise interfere with
the trial court's disposition of the underlying merits."); Morales-Feliciano v. Parole Bd. of
Commonwealth of P.R., 887 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1989); Joseph F. Hughes & Co., 390 F.2d
at 630.
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courts are often concerned with providing some opportunity for
appellate review.'
So several courts have, for example, allowed immediate appeals
from interlocutory orders denying discovery in post-judgment collection proceedings.' The denial of discovery can leave a judgment creditor with no means of attaching a judgment debtor's
property.'33 And so there is little prospect in these cases of a future order that more resembles a traditional final judgment and
from which an appeal could normally be taken.' If there is to be
any review, it must be immediate. 3' In contrast, interlocutory orders granting discovery in post-judgment proceedings have generally not been deemed immediately appealable. A party wishing
to immediately appeal such an order can obtain review by disobeying36the order and appealing from a subsequent finding of contempt.
Courts have been similarly generous with appellate jurisdiction
over orders issued during a district court's ongoing supervision of
an injunction or consent decree.' In some of these cases, the protracted nature of the proceedings requires an immediate appeal
for there to be any appeal at all; with no end to the proceedings in
131. See, e.g., Miller, 975 F.2d at 550 ("Another reason for downplaying the courts' traditional concern over piecemeal appeals is that further proceedings are not likely to produce an order that is any more final than the one at issue."); Morales-Feliciano,887 F.2d
at 4.
132. See, e.g., Ohntrup v. Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 760 F.3d 290, 294 (3d
Cir. 2014); Wilkinson v. FBI, 922 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1991); Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber,
664 F.2d 260, 262 (11th Cir. 1981); United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 105 (5th
Cir. 1967).
133. See, e.g., Ohntrup, 760 F.3d at 294.
134. E.g., Wilkinson, 922 F.2d at 558; McWhirter, 376 F.2d at 105.
135. See, e.g., McWhirter, 376 F.2d at 105.
136. See, e.g., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Express Freight Lines,
Inc., 971 F.2d 5, 6 (7th Cir. 1992); Rouse Constr. Int'l, Inc. v. Rouse Constr. Corp., 680
F.2d 743, 746 (11th Cir. 1982). But see Rodriguez v. IBP, Inc., 243 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th
Cir. 2001). The Rodriguez court's holding that it had jurisdiction over an order compelling
discovery in post-judgment proceedings might be better explained as a contempt appeal,
since the target of the discovery order had been held in contempt. See id. at 1226.
137. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Knote, 29 F.3d 1297, 1299 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 12 F.3d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180,
183 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Washington, 761 F.2d 1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985). The
Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has rejected the balancing approach in this context; it has
deemed mandamus to be the more appropriate avenue for review. See Gautreaux v. Chi.
Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 1999); Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060, 1062-63
(7th Cir. 1998).
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sight, courts will not force the litigants to wait indefinitely. In
Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, the Ninth Circuit held that it had
jurisdiction to review a district court order issued during the remedial phase of prison-reform litigation. 138 As part of its ongoing
supervision of an order requiring California to bring its prisons
into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act and
other laws, the district court had ordered the state to develop a
plan for implementing certain practices at county jails. 139 The
Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over California's appeal. 4 ' After noting that finality was to be given a practical rather than a technical construction, the court stated that in postjudgment proceedings it was "less concerned with piecemeal review.., and more concerned with allowing some opportunity for
review, because 'unless such [post-judgment] orders are found final, there is often little prospect that further proceedings will occur to make them final."""' In Armstrong, the district court contemplated no further orders regarding the county jails, and if the
state complied with the district court's order, "it [was] unclear
that there would be any future opportunity for [it] to appeal.'4 2
In other cases involving injunctions or consent decrees, immediate review is necessary not because there is no end to the proceedings in sight, but because the order would be effectively unreviewable were review delayed. In United States v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, for example, the Second Circuit held
that it had jurisdiction to review a district court order entered as
part of the court's ongoing supervision of the United States' consent decree with the Teamsters.' The district court had issued
rules regarding the election of the union's officers, and the union
appealed. 144 The Second Circuit noted that administering a complex consent decree "often require[s] intermediate acts by parties
that may be unreviewable if appeals are delayed until compliance

138. 622 F.3d at 1065.
139. Id. at 1064.
140. Id. at 1065.
141. Id. at 1064 (quoting United States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d 1181, 1185
(9th Cir. 1995)).
142. Id. at 1065; see also, e.g., United States v. Washington, 761 F.2d 1404, 1407 (9th
Cir. 1985) (reviewing immediately a district court order apportioning fishing rights as part
of enforcing an earlier judgment; this was "the only opportunity for meaningful review").
143. 931 F.2d 177, 183 (2d Cir. 1991).
144. Id. at 182.
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' Appealability in this context accordingly requires "a
is final."145
flexible approach."'46 In the case of the officer elections, immediate review was necessary for there to be any review. "' If the appeal came after the elections, those challenging the district
court's order would face the immense burden of proving that any
error in interpreting the consent decree was harmful-that is,
that the election outcome would have been different. 4 ' And even
were the court to order a new election, immense amounts of time
and money would have been wasted in conducting the initial election."' Because the need for immediate review was so great, the
court held that it had jurisdiction."'

Many other decisions from the courts of appeals reflect a balancing approach to post-judgment appeals. In Tweedle v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., for example, the Eighth Circuit held
that it had jurisdiction to review several post-judgment orders
even though other (and somewhat related) motions remained
pending in the district court."' In Tweedle, the plaintiffs exhusband intervened in post-judgment proceedings to collect on a
damages award, claiming an entitlement to some of the award." 2
The court determined that, under the particular facts of Tweedle,
the grant of the motion to intervene-which normally cannot be
immediately appealed-was a final, appealable order even though
the husband's entitlement to any of the award had not yet been
determined."3 The court recognized that another appeal might be
required after the ex-husband's rights were determined, but it
thought this consideration insufficient to defeat the appeal."' Indeed, the court thought its "disposition of the orders on appeal
[would] actually advance resolution of the litigation, at least as to

145. Id. at 183.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.; see also, e.g., Diaz
1988) (reviewing immediately
view delayed, the plan would
moot).
151. 527 F.3d 664, 670 (8th
152. Id. at 667.
153. Id. at 669.
154. Id. at 670.

v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 861 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir.
a desegregation plan for a particular school year; were rebe implemented for that school year and the issues thus
Cir. 2008).
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the disputes between the original parties. ' Although unresolved
and related outstanding issues remained outstanding, the court"relying on 'practical instead of technical considerations"'-held
that those motions did not preclude an appeal.'
The balancing approach can also be seen in decisions declining
to find appellate jurisdiction. In United States v. Michigan, the
Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order
granting a party "litigating amicus curiae" status in postjudgment proceedings regarding prison conditions." 7 The court
invoked Gillespie's instruction to weigh the costs and benefits of
an immediate appeal." 8 In following that instruction, the court
determined that the order was not sufficiently important to merit
immediate review; it simply let some of the inmates covered by
the consent decree to participate in the case." 9
C. Ministerial/Technical Remnants
A district court decision is generally not final if it determines
liability but leaves open other matters, such as the amount of
damages.'' (The one major exception to this rule is attorney's
fees-a district court judgment that leaves open issues of attorney's fees is considered a final, appealable order.)' And rightfully
so. Were the liability and damages determinations separately appealable, they could result in two separate appeals: one on liability and another on the amount of damages. It is generally more
efficient to wait and address questions of liability and damages in
a single appeal.
Courts have eased this requirement when the remaining matters before the district court involve what courts characterize as
merely "ministerial" or "technical" matters. For example, courts

155. Id. (noting also that "disposition of the other issues on appeal [would] facilitate
final resolution").
156. Id. at 668 (quoting Giove v. Stanko, 49 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1995)).
157. 901 F.2d 503, 504 (6th Cir. 1990) (withdrawn opinion).
158. Id. at 506.
159. Id. at 507.
160. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976); HSBC Bank
USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Damages are part of the
judgment and essential to finality; lack of quantified damages prevents an appeal.").
161. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988); Ray Haluch
Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund, 134 S. Ct. 773, 780 (2014).
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have deemed district court findings of liability appealable when
the determination of damages will be mechanical and uncontroversial.16 2 Courts have reached a similar conclusion on orders remanding disputes to administrative agencies or other bodies that
require only ministerial, straightforward action by those bodies.163
In these cases, the order appealed from does not satisfy the
traditional definition of finality.164 But because the remaining issues are uncontroversial and straightforward, the parties are unlikely to dispute them. The appeal on liability is thus likely to be
the only appeal, and the normal concern over piecemeal review
diminishes.161
The balancing inherent in the ministerial/technical exception is
obvious. These cases minimize the normal costs of allowing an
appeal from a non-final order; there is little chance of another ap162. See, e.g., Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding in a
tax-refund suit that a district court order granting a refund but not calculating the
amount was appealable, as "the calculation of this refund [was] merely a ministerial
task"); Prod. & Maint. Emps. Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954 F.2d 1397, 1401-02 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that a district court order concluding that an employer had wrongfully
amended a retirement plan was appealable even though the court had not calculated the
proper amount of accrued benefits because "[d]etermining that amount [was] just a matter
of plugging information into the formula"); Woosley v. Avco Corp., 944 F.2d 313, 317 (6th
Cir. 1991).
163. See, e.g., Verizon Wash. v. Commc'n Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 571 F.3d 1296,
1301 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding in a dispute over the interpretation of a collectivebargaining agreement, the district court's order remanding the dispute to the arbitrator
was immediately appealable because the arbitrator's only task on remand was to modify
the amount of an award in a manner consistent with the district court's opinion); Vitale v.
Latrobe Area Hosp., 420 F.3d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding an order remanding a dispute to an ERISA plan administrator was immediately appealable when all the district
court required of the administrator was a "mechanical" calculation of benefits; "the Plan
contain[ed] a precise mathematical formula for calculating the monthly retirement benefit,
and the inputs to the formula [were] all undisputed facts"); Pauly v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
348 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding an order remanding a dispute to the Department of Agriculture was final because "the district court's partial remand [was] extremely
narrow and merely require[d] a mechanical recalculation of the recapture amount under
current agency regulations").
164. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015); Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 815, 817
(7th Cir. 2015) ("We conclude, therefore, that a judgment foreclosing a federal tax lien and
specifying how the proceeds are to be applied is appealable because it ends the litigation
and leaves nothing but execution of the court's decision, the standard definition of 'final'
under § 1291.").
165. See Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that an outstanding calculation of expenses was "unlikely to result in a later appeal"); Morgan v. United
States, 968 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The rationale is that when what remains to be
done is merely routine, that routine decision will not spark an appeal; hence permitting
the earlier review will not thwart the policy against piecemeal appeals.").
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peal and thus little risk of piecemeal review. There is also some
benefit to hearing the appeal immediately: dismissing for lack of
a final order often seems wasteful. The parties have already spent
time and money addressing the merits. Making them start over
after the district court enters what is likely an uncontroversial
and inevitable order would waste all that effort.
The true influence of the balancing approach, however, is evident in the case-by-case determinations that this exception requires. Courts must assess the outstanding tasks to determine on
which side of the ministerial/technical line a district court's decision falls. In each case, the court must determine the likelihood of
a dispute over the remaining issues and balance that against the
potential waste of dismissing the appeal. And courts have spent
much time (or at least much ink) explaining why a particular order does not satisfy this exception.166
D. Cumulative Finality
The doctrine of cumulative finality is another example of practical finality. Cumulative finality comes into play when parties
file a notice of appeal before the district court enters a final
judgment. (Notices of appeal must generally be filed within thirty
days of the final judgment.'67 ) The doctrine "cures" these prematurely (and improperly) filed notices when the district court proterminated by the time the case reaches the appelceedings have
16
late court.
Cumulative finality applies to a standard-and surprisingly
common-set of circumstances. The district court enters a non-

166. See, e.g., Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 190-92 (3d Cir. 2001); Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 934-37 (3d Cir. 1994).
167. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
168. The cumulative finality doctrine's relation to the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) is unclear. Rule 4(a)(2) states that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court
announces a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order-is treated
as filed on the date of and after the entry." FED. R. App. P.4(a)(2). The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a premature notice of appeal when it is filed
from a decision a litigant "reasonably but mistakenly believes to be a final judgment, while
failing to file a notice of appeal from the actual final judgment." FirsTier Mort. Co. v.
Inv'rs Mort. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991). It is unclear whether the cumulative finality doctrine is part of Rule 4(a)(2) or separate from it. See, e.g., In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284,
289 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing the cumulative finality doctrine as "the confluence of Rule
4(a)(2), as interpreted in FirsTier,and Rule 54(b)").
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final order (for example, one dismissing some but not all claims,'
or one determining liability but leaving open a substantial issue
regarding damages),1 7 and a party files a notice of appeal. Since
the district court proceedings are not finished and there is no final judgment, the notice is ineffective. The district court later addresses the remaining issues in the case and enters a final judgment. But the party does not file a new notice of appeal after that
final judgment.
The appellate court is faced with a jurisdictional quandary. The
party seeking review filed a notice of appeal before there was ever
a final judgment, and such a notice is technically ineffective. That
party has accordingly never filed a proper notice of appeal from
the final judgment. The court arguably lacks appellate jurisdiction in this scenario.
Cumulative finality solves this problem. The courts have generally held that so long as district court proceedings have terminated and a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard, the court will treat the notice of appeal as having
been filed after the final judgment. 71 The notice of appeal is thus
deemed timely and the court exercises jurisdiction.
169. See, e.g., Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 478-79 (4th Cir. 2015).
170. See, e.g., Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 391 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir.
2004).
171. The Courts of Appeals have developed different rules regarding cumulative finality, particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in FirsTier.See supra note 164. Some
have incorporated cumulative finality into Rule 4(a)(2) and require that the district court's
initial non-final decision-the one from which the premature notice of appeal was filedbe one that would have been appealable if immediately followed by a Civil Rule 54(b) or
Criminal Rule 32.2(c)(3) certification. See, e.g., Miller v. Gorski Wladyslaw Estate, 547
F.3d 273, 277 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Bryson, 406 F.3d at 288; Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21
F.3d 1181, 1186 (1st Cir. 1994). Others hold simply that district court proceedings must
terminate by the time the appellate court hears the merits; there is no express requirement that the initial non-final order could have been immediately appealed if certified,
although the initial orders are often of that type. See, e.g., Schippers v. United States, 715
F.3d 879, 885 (11th Cir. 2013); Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Riffle, 617 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir.
2010); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 691
(9th Cir. 2010); Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 391 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir.
2004); General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 311 n.3 (3d Cir.
2001). The Eighth Circuit currently claims to not recognize the cumulative finality doctrine, though its earlier decisions did. See Kramer v. Cash Link Sys., 652 F.3d 840, 842
(8th Cir. 2011); Miller v. Special Weapons, L.L.C., 369 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2004). But
see Merchs. & Planters Bank of Newport v. Smith, 516 F.2d 355, 356 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam) (holding that the court had jurisdiction despite a prematurely filed notice of
appeal because the district court disposed of the remaining claims after oral argument before the court of appeals but before it issued its decision). The Federal Circuit appears to
have rejected the doctrine, albeit in an unpublished decision. Meade Instruments Corp. v.
Reddwarf Starware, LLC, No. 99-1517, 2000 WL 987268, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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The cumulative finality doctrine was built atop the balancing
approach. 172 Again, and on a potentially superficial level, several
of the early cases developing or adopting the doctrine invoke Gillespie's instruction to take a practical rather than technical approach to appellate jurisdiction.11 But the cumulative finality
cases also reflect a balancing of the costs and benefits of appeals
before a final judgment-in cases of cumulative finality, the reasons for delaying appeal until after a final judgment are minimized in two ways.
First, most courts require that district court proceedings end by
the time the court of appeals reached the merits before applying
the doctrine. This requirement eliminates the risk of additional
appeals. The normal reason for delaying appellate reviewavoiding piecemeal appeals-is not a factor in these cases.1 7 4

172. Wright, Miller & Cooper recognize that Gillespie's balancing approach was the
basis for the cumulative finality doctrine. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3913
("The Gillespie decision was put to good use in establishing the principle that an appeal
taken before complete disposition of a case could be salvaged by subsequent entry of an
order accomplishing complete disposition.").
173. Jetco Elecs. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973), is probably one
of the first cases to articulate the cumulative finality doctrine. Jetco was a multidefendant suit, and the plaintiffs filed their only notice of appeal after the district court
had dismissed the claims against only one of the defendants. Id. at 1231. The Fifth Circuit
recognized that the plaintiffs had appealed from a non-final order, and there was no Rule
54(b) certification that would have permitted the appeal. Id. (Rule 54(b) allows a district
court to certify for immediate appeal an order that dismisses some (but not all) of the
claims or defendants in a suit. For more on Rule 54(b), see generally Pollis, Rule 54(b), supra note 9). But the court refused to "exalt form over substance" and held that the premature notice of appeal-"under the circumstances of [that] case" was sufficient to grant
appellate jurisdiction. Id. And the court did so "[m]indful of the Supreme Court's command
that practical, not technical, considerations are to govern the application of principles of
finality." Id. (citing Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964)). Later courts
similarly invoked Gillespie. See Equip. Fin. Grp. Inc. v. Traverse Comput. Brokers, 973
F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992) (adopting the cumulative finality doctrine and noting that
"the procedural circumstances ... warrant a practical approach to finality" (citing Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152)); Sacks v. Rothberg, 845 F.2d 1098, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (adopting
the cumulative finality doctrine while noting that doing so "comport[ed] with the Supreme
Court's admonition that 'the requirement of finality is to be given a practical rather than
technical construction' (quoting Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152)); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
630 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (adopting the cumulative finality doctrine and noting
that the cumulative finality cases "provide clear examples of giving a practical rather than
a technical construction to the finality rule"). Wright, Miller, and Cooper suggest that the
cumulative finality doctrine "is so well established that there is no remaining need to rely
on the Gillespie decision." 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3913. That's probably true,
but the balancing approach still provided the doctrine's foundation.
174. See Sacks, 845 F.2d at 1099-1100; Anderson, 630 F.2d at 681.
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Second, several cumulative finality cases have required that
there be no prejudice to the appellees. 17' This, too, minimizes the
cost of appeals from non-final orders. There is no risk of surprise
or harassment, nor is there a risk of imposing the costs of duplicative appeals on the appellee.
Cases of cumulative finality thus present no real reason to delay an appeal except for adhering to technical requirements. So
faced with the decision of dismissing the case for lack of appellate
jurisdiction or overlooking the technical error in filing the notice
of appeal, courts have largely gone with the latter. And that's because the normal cost of piecemeal review is minimized.
E. Pure PragmaticAppeals
Finally, some cases still engage in Gillespie-like ad hoc pragmatic balancing, despite the Supreme Court's seeming burial of
that case.
Pragmatic balancing survives most prominently in the Ninth
Circuit, although its cases are something of a mixed bag. Several
years after Coopers & Lybrand, the Ninth Circuit continued to
treat Gillespie as a viable source of appellate jurisdiction and
even laid out a four-part test for determining jurisdiction under
Gillespie."' While appeals under this approach are not common,
the Ninth Circuit did use it to find appellate jurisdiction over
non-final orders. In Service Employees International Union, Local
102 v. County of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review a series of partial summary judgment orders.1 7 7 These orders, even taken together, did not yet result in a
final decision of the case-there was no calculation of damages,
175. This requirement is often part of the Third and Ninth Circuit's rules for cumulative finality. See, e.g., DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 215 (3d Cir.
2007); Fadem v. United States, 42 F.3d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1994).
176. See In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 813 F.2d 1473, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in Gillespie was based upon the unique circumstances of
the case: (1) the case was a "marginally final order," (2) "disposed of an unsettled issue of
national significance," (3) review "implemented the same policy Congress sought to promote in § 1292(b)," and (4) the finality issue was not presented to the Supreme Court until
argument on the merits, thereby ensuring that policies of judicial economy would not be
served by remanding the case with an important unresolved issue.").
(quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978)); see also SEIU, Local 102 v. City of San Diego, 60 F.3d 1346, 1350 (9th Cir. 1994).
177. SEIU, Local 102, 60 F.3d at 1349-50.
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which is normally required for an order to be final.178 The court
nevertheless deemed the orders appealable under Gillespie: the
orders were "marginally final" and separate from the damages issue; the orders presented "an unsettled issue of national significance" (whether county employees were exempt from Fair Labor
Standards Act coverage); and the merits were fully briefed and
argued, meaning that dismissing the appeal would have rendered
useless all the time already put into it.17
The Ninth Circuit recently appears to have pulled back on
pragmatic appeals, adding a requirement that a case must not extend the balancing approach beyond the truly unique facts of Gillespie."'0 A case that satisfies this new requirement is likely rare;
the court characterized such a case as an "albino black bear.' ' s1 (It
is unclear if the court realized that such creatures do, in fact, exist.) 82 But the court has not expressly foreclosed-and continues
to entertain the possibility of-pragmatic appeals.'
The Tenth Circuit similarly appears to still recognize the possibility of purely pragmatic appeals. Although that court initially
deemed the balancing approach dead in light of Coopers &
Lybrand,' it resuscitated the doctrine in the mid-1980s. 51 Under
the Tenth Circuit's approach, if "the issue under consideration [is]
'important,' 'serious,' 'unsettled,' and 'not within the trial court's
discretion,"' the court should take jurisdiction "if injustice from
delay would outweigh the expense and inconvenience of piecemeal review.""' That being said, the Tenth Circuit has also suggested that the balancing approach should only be used in "truly

178. See id. at 1349; see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742 (1976).
179. SEIU, Local 102, 60 F.3d at 1350; see also Nehmer v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 494 F.3d 846, 856 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).
180. See Comm'r of Int'l Revenue v. JT USA, LP, 630 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2011);
see also Solis v. Jasmine Hall Care Homes, Inc., 610 F.3d 541, 545-46 (9th Cir. 2010).
181. Jasmine Hall Care Homes, Inc., 610 F.3d at 545.
182. See Andrew McKean, Albino Bear, OUTDOOR LIFE, http://www.outdoorlife.com/pho
tos/gallery/hunting/2009/1 1/albino-bear/?image=0.
183. See J.L. v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., No. 12-57053, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13476,
at *2 (9th Cir. July 10, 2014).
184. See Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1979), revd on other
grounds, sub nom., Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980).
185. See Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1247 (10th Cir. 1984).
186. Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 752 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender, 744
F.2d at 1247).
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unique instances."18' 7 In practice, the Tenth Circuit largely confines any allowance of pragmatic appeals to the administrativeremand context.'88
For some years after Cooper & Lybrand, the Federal Circuit
continued to allow pragmatic appeals. Relying on Gillespie, the
Federal Circuit allowed appeals when "the effect of the [lower
court's interlocutory] order was 'fundamental to the further conduct of the case.""89 So in Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Reeves Bros.,
Inc., the Federal Circuit permitted an appeal from a district court
order denying the plaintiff leave to amend its pleadings. 9 ° But the
court later seemed to reject the use of pragmatic appeals.' In an
interlocutory appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
the Federal Circuit read Coopers & Lybrand to limit Gillespie to
its "unique facts."'92 Because similar facts "could not possibly
arise" before the Board, the Federal Circuit held that "Gillespie
no longer provide[d] a viable basis upon which [it] may entertain
appeals from interlocutory . . .orders of that tribunal."' 93 Later
Federal Circuit decisions extended this holding to interlocutory
appeals from district courts. 9 4 But even after this seeming rejec187. Id. So, for example, the Tenth Circuit has refused to hear a pragmatic appeal from
discovery orders adverse to a claim of attorney-client privilege; the issues presented in
these orders (which were then "unsettled questions about the application of privileges in
the context of state and federal licensing proceedings") were "not of the magnitude that
justify an exception to the traditional 'final order' requirement." Id.
188. See, e.g., W. Energy All. v. Salazar, 709 F.3d 1040, 1049 (10th Cir. 2013).
189. Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 736 F.2d 1508, 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(quoting Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964)).
190. Id. at 1509, 1512. The proposed amendment involved issues that were factually
related to those already presented in the pleadings. See id. at 1512. The court thought it
would be more efficient to hear an immediate appeal; were the order later reversed after a
final judgment and the case remanded for a trial of the new issues, the parties would need
"to resubmit evidence previously presented, argued, and weighed by the district court." Id.
"The potential costs and wasted judicial resources of an additional trial on substantially
the same evidence demand[ed] the application of Gillespie." Id.
191. See Copelands' Enters., Inc. v. CNV, Inc., 887 F.2d 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (en
banc).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Spread Spectrum Screening, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 657 F.3d 1349,
1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Steri-Lube Int'l, Ltd. v. W. Phase Change, Inc., No. 001471, 2000 WL 1643785, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2000) (unpublished table decision); Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. N. Am. Sci. Assocs., Inc., No. 99-1409, 1999 WL 669502, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 16, 1999) (unpublished table decision); Giese v. Vector Labs., Inc., No. 574, 1999
WL 50674, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 21, 1999) (unpublished table decision) (noting that "the
Supreme Court has curtailed the doctrine set forth in Gillespie as a basis for accepting an
appeal from an interlocutory order"); Kerr Mfg. Co. v. Centrix, Inc., No. 94-1132, 1994 WL
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tion of pragmatic appeals, the Federal Circuit has not overruled
Tenneco Resins, and it has allowed at least one pragmatic appeal
(albeit in an unpublished decision).19 5
A few other circuits continue to treat pragmatic appeals as a
potential source of appellate jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit
has repeatedly stated that there exists an exception to the finaljudgment rule for marginally final orders that present issues
fundamental to the case.196 The Seventh Circuit continues to recognize the balancing approach under what it calls "practical final'
But neither of these circuits appears to have allowed a
ity."197
purely pragmatic appeal in several years. The D.C. Circuit, in
contrast, does not expressly endorse pragmatic appeals but recently allowed one without saying as much. 9 '
That all being said, some circuits have squarely refused to use
the balancing approach for interlocutory orders since Coopers &
Lybrand.' Others have been more coy with their rejection, refus371645, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 1994) (unpublished table decision); Elan Transdermal
Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., No. 92-1068, 1992 WL 55576, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21,
1992) (unpublished table decision).
195. In Swede Indus., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., the Federal Circuit allowed an appeal from a
partial grant of summary judgment. No. 93-1403, 1994 WL 124024, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
12, 1994) (unpublished table decision). The case involved alleged infringement of a utility
patent and a design patent. Id. at *1. The district court's order apparently determined only that the design patent had not been infringed-leaving the utility patent claim undecided-and the plaintiff immediately appealed that order. Id. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal under what it called "the Gillespie rule." Id. at *2.
196. See United States v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12114, at *12
(11th Cir. June 13, 2013) (per curiam); Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Fort Lauderdale v.
Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); see also In re
Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc., 796 F.2d 1435, 1437 (11th Cir. 1986).
197. See United States v. Bokhari, 757 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2014); Edalatdju v. Lazer, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24003, at *6 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d
919, 922 (7th Cir. 1993); Richardson v. Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 1990); Crowder
v. Sullivan, 897 F.2d 252, 253 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). But see Bogard v. Wright, 159
F.3d 1060, 1063 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting "the concept of 'pragmatic finality' in the context of post-judgment appeals as "formless").
198. In Murthy v.Vilsack, 609 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the D.C. Circuit held that
it had jurisdiction to review a district court order dismissing a Title VII claim after breach
of contract claims were transferred to the Court of Federal Claims. Normally a dismissal
followed by a transfer of remaining claims requires the dismissed claim to tag along with
the transferred claims; appeal from the transferred claims then includes review of the initially dismissed claim. But here, the transferee court (the Court of Federal Claims) lacked
jurisdiction over the Title VII claim. While a Rule 54(b) certification would have been the
proper avenue for an appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the lack of one did not preclude
appellate jurisdiction.
199. The Second Circuit appears to have rejected the continued use of pragmatic appeals. In LTU Steel Co., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of Am. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 922
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ing to deem pragmatic appeals foreclosed and still appear to entertain the possibility of allowing one. But these courts have essentially cabined the doctrine; they deem such appeals proper only in truly unique circumstances, which are never present.2 0
The balancing approach survives in other contexts. Courts have
sometimes invoked the balancing approach in appeals from partial grants of summary judgment. A partial grant of summary
judgment is normally not a final order, as the order leaves other
claims or issues unresolved. But courts have sometimes looked
behind partial grants of summary judgment to conclude that a
district court was essentially done with a case, even though it had
not disposed of all outstanding issues.2 1
The balancing approach has also been used to find appellate jurisdiction from dismissals without prejudice. A dismissal without
prejudice is normally not a final order; the dismissal leaves the
plaintiff with an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure any
defects. Plaintiffs wishing to stand on a complaint dismissed
without prejudice normally must announce their intention to do
so for the dismissal to become a final, appealable order. But
F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1990), that court refused to read Gillespie to "permit[] an appeal from
an interlocutory order based on a balancing of the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal review against the danger of denying justice by delay." The Supreme Court had, according to
the Second Circuit, "rejected the view that Gillespie permits the court to decide close cases
of finality by an ad hoc balancing." Id. The Second Circuit does not appear to have allowed
a pragmatic appeal since.
The Fifth Circuit continued to allow pragmatic appeals for several years after Coopers &
Lybrand. But it eventually rejected their continued use. See Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (calling the balancing
approach "in fundamental conflict with the values and purposes of the finality rule to
avoid the delay and system-costs of piecemeal and multiple appeals, and to provide a relatively clear test of appealability so that needless precautionary appeals not be taken"); see
also Hamilton Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d 367, 382 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis,
J., dissenting) ("This court no longer recognizes the pragmatic finality exception."); Kmart
Corp. v. Aronds, 123 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1997).
200. The First Circuit has not squarely rejected pragmatic appeals. It has, however,
noted the Supreme Court's rejection of "a broad balancing approach to questions of finality," Anderson v. City of Boston, 244 F.3d 236, 241 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995)), and expressed doubt about whether pragmatic appeals (which it
calls "the pragmatic finality doctrine") are still allowed. See Anderson, 236 F.3d at 241
(stating "the pragmatic finality doctrine, if it still survives, does not apply [to the facts of
this case]"); see also Petralia v. AT&T Glob. Info. Sols. Co., 114 F.3d 352, 354-55 (1st Cir.
1997) (treating an appellant's invocation of Gillespie as a petition for a writ of mandamus).
201. See Acton v. City of Columbia, 436 F.3d 969, 974-75 (8th Cir. 2006). But see Solis
v. Hooglands Nursery LLC, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9890, at *4 (5th Cir. May 5, 2009) (per
curiam) (refusing to review where the district court has not formally finished with the
case).
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courts have sometimes looked behind a dismissal without prejudice to determine that, while not technically final, the order was
the district court's last word on the matter.0 2
The balancing approach thus persists in the courts of appeals,
despite its seeming burial by the Supreme Court and the widespread consensus on its death.
III. THE BALANCING APPROACH, FLEXIBILITY,
AND INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL REFORM

This persistence-and the literature's failure to notice this persistence-raises several questions for the study and practice of
appellate jurisdiction. I address two of those questions in this
part: (1) Why have the courts persisted in using the balancing
approach? (2) What are the implications of this persistence for interlocutory appeal reform?
A. The InescapableAllure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction
First, why? Why have courts persisted in invoking the balancing approach-seemingly in defiance of the Supreme Court's directions on matters of appellate jurisdiction-to hear appeals? I
suspect that the answer lies in the inescapable allure of flexibility
in defining appellate jurisdiction.
Congress and the Supreme Court have-in theory-created a
system of appellate jurisdiction that largely relies on categorical
rules and eschews discretion. This system starts with Congress,
which defines the courts of appeals' jurisdiction. Congress has
generally limited that jurisdiction to appeals from final judg0 When it allows discretion-such as section 1292(b) and
ments."
Rule 23(f), discussed previously-Congress does so through express grants of power. The Supreme Court has-especially recently-tried to adhere to these bright lines in appellate jurisdiction.

202. See, e.g., Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 845-46
(9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs claim without prejudice was intended to be the final action in the case); Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465
F.3d 444, 454 (10th Cir. 2006) (deciding that the district court's intent was to dismiss the
plaintiffs entire claim, not just her complaint, and the appellate court thus had jurisdiction).
203. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
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It has largely narrowed judge-made exceptions to the finaljudgment rule. The Court's rejection of Gillespie is one example.
Its conclusion in Mohawk that further exceptions to the finaljudgment rule should come through rulemaking, not judicial decisions, is another." 4 And the Court has repeatedly attempted to
narrow the most common judge-made exception, the collateral order doctrine, leading some to conclude that any future expansion
of the doctrine is unlikely."' Even when judge-made exceptions
apply, the Court has squarely rejected case-by-case analysis; exceptions are to be made over entire categories of orders or not at
all. The takeaway of all this is that-again, in theory-the rules
of appellate jurisdiction should be clear, predictable, and leave
courts with little room for case-by-case assessments of whether to
hear an appeal.
But the practice of appellate jurisdiction is different. There are,
to be sure, some clear rules that give parties a right to appeal.
But there is also discretion.0 6 Judges will sometimes run into appeals that the most straightforward application of the finaljudgment rule (and its exceptions) would require dismissing. In
some of these instances, the court thinks that it should hear the
case now rather than wait until later. Courts in this latter situation are not always great at letting go. Rather than let go, they
find some source of appellate jurisdiction. Sometimes, as catalogued above, that source is the balancing approach. Sometimes it
is some other nuance of appellate jurisdiction, such as the collateral order doctrine or writs of mandamus. 7
In practice, this amounts to discretionary appellate jurisdiction: judges are determining for themselves which appeals to immediately hear and which to save for later.
The fact that judges use final-judgment rule's exceptions to exercise discretion is not news; others have described this practice
elsewhere, and the cases discussed above add to the evidence."'

204. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
206. See Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 9, at 1651; Steinman, supra note 6,
at 1256, 1273.
207. See Steinman, supra note 6, at 1256, 1273 (describing courts' use of the collateral
order doctrine and writs of mandamus as a basis for discretionary appeals).
208. See Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 9, at 1651; Steinman, supra note 6,
at 1256, 1273.
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But what is unique about the balancing approach is the level of
defiance in which the courts of appeals have engaged. When judges invoke the balancing approach to find jurisdiction over an appeal, they are doing precisely what Gillespie seemed to promiseand they are doing precisely what the Supreme Court said they
should not.
The persistence of the balancing approach thus suggests not
only that appellate judges like to exercise some flexibility in defining their jurisdiction, but also that they cannot help but use
flexibility to reach what they believe to be sensible outcomes. Appellate judges were more or less told to stop using the balancing
approach. They did not. They instead found that Gillespie and the
balancing approach provide a useful tool for trying to reach what
these judges deem reasonable results. This suggests that they
simply cannot give up having some flexibility in defining their jurisdiction.
B. Interlocutory Appeal Reform and the Allure of Flexibility
The answer to the first question-why have the courts of appeals persisted in using the balancing approach-lies at least
partially in judges' inability to give up flexibility in defining their
jurisdiction. Putting aside whether this is a good or legitimate
practice, I'm concerned about the challenge it poses to appellate
jurisdiction reform.
Reform has long been a focus of the appellate jurisdiction literature. By nearly every account, the current system of federal appellate jurisdiction-a general final-judgment rule mixed with a
variety of statutory, rule-based, and judge-made exceptions-is a
mess. 9 The criticisms have been covered extensively elsewhere

209. See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 9, at 729 ("[T]he unanimous view of commentators
is that the rule has either too many or too few exceptions, but in any event requires revision."). Some suggest that the system is functioning relatively well. See, e.g., Glynn, supra
note 6, at 179 ("[T]he current regime is in far better shape than commonly appreciated.");
Steinman, supra note 6, at 1272 ("The federal courts ... have worked within the cumbersome doctrinal and procedural framework to implement a system of interlocutory appellate review that, in practice, is fairly sensible. If one looks at the results on the groundi.e., which interlocutory orders are immediately appealable and which are not-the jurisdictional landscape is commendable."). But they, too, note that there is still room for reform. See Glynn, supra note 6, at 181; Steinman, supra note 6, at 1277.
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and need not be repeated here.210 Suffice it to say that most everyone views the system as overly complex and insufficiently predictable,2 1' such that judges and litigants spend far too much time
figuring out appellate jurisdiction.2
With all this criticism have come calls for reform, both narrow
21 3
(that is, focusing on a particular type of order) and wholesale.
The wholesale reformers generally fall into one of two camps. The
first camp proposes a system of rules.2"4 Reformers in this camp
would keep the traditional final-judgment rule (so litigants would
still have a right to appeal at the end of district court proceedings), but they would replace the current judge-made exceptions
with rules defining the types of orders that are appealable before
a final judgment. 2" 5 The other camp of reformers proposes a system of discretion. Like rule advocates, discretion advocates would
retain the final-judgment rule. But they would give the courts of

210. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation, supra note 6; Steinman,
supra note 6.
211. See Carrington, supra note 9, at 165-66 (noting "the unconscionable intricacy of
the existing law, depending as it does on overlapping exceptions, each less lucid than the
next"); Cooper, supra note 9, at 157 ("The final judgment requirement has been supplemented by a list of elaborations, expansions, evasions, and outright exceptions that is dazzling in its complexity."); Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 9, at 291 (calling the current
system "arcane and confusing"); Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 6; Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 9, at 1651 (noting the "labyrinthian conglomeration of jurisdictional rules"); Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-AppealabilityProblem, 47
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (1984) ("The existing federal finality-appealability situation is an unacceptable morass."); Waters, supra note 9, at 556 (noting the "dizzying array
of statutory and judicially-created [finality] exceptions").
212. Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation, supra note 6, at 431 ("The
broader exceptions are much less predictable. They are plagued by vague terms and inconsistent treatment in the courts, such that both litigants and judges spend far too much
time trying to determine what can be appealed and when."); see also Cooper, supra note 9,
at 157 (arguing that even "[1]awyers and judges who are experts in working with the system ... often encounter elusive uncertainty in seeking clear answers to many problems");
Luther T. Munford, Dangers, Toils, and Snares: Appeals Before Final Judgment, 15 LITIG.
18, 18 (1989) (noting that the appealability regime "provides the kind of excursions into
legal history and abstract analysis that can drive practical litigators crazy"); Rosenberg,
supra note 211, at 172 ("Entirely too much of the appellate courts' energy is absorbed in
deciding whether they are entitled under the finality principle and in its exceptions to
hear cases brought before them-and in explaining why or why not.").
213. See supra note 9.
214. See Carrington, supra note 9, at 167-68; Glynn, supra note 6, at 259; Rosenberg,
supra note 211, at 179.
215. Timothy P. Glynn, for example, has argued for clear rules that permit an immediate appeal in specific categories of "problem areas." See Glynn, supra note 6, at 259 ("Expansion of interlocutory appellate review should be limited primarily to mandatory review
of narrowly defined categories of orders within 'problem areas."').
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appeals discretion to hear a case any time before a final judgment. Discretion-not rules-would replace the current judgemade exceptions.2 16
Whatever the merits of these two approaches, I have argued
elsewhere (and continue to believe) that rule-based reform is far
more likely than a wholesale switch to discretion.217 But if judges
will inevitably find a way to inject some flexibility into appellate
jurisdiction-as the persistence of the balancing approach suggests-there is a threat to successful reform.
The likely (though not certain) benefits of rule-based reform
would be certainty, predictability, and ease of application; clear
rules are more likely to attain these than discretionary appeals. 1 8
But a system of wholly categorical rules would-like any system
of rules-be over- and under-inclusive; it would sometimes produce results that judges perceive as unreasonable or unjust.2 19
More specifically, a system of only categorical rules would likely
deny immediate appeals in some situations that judges think
merit an immediate appeal.
Judges faced with this situation would need to either forego exercising some flexibility or find some way to inject flexibility into
the categorical rules. Given the allure and usefulness of flexibility
illustrated above, the latter seems likely. Flexibility would likely
work its way into the rules through interpretation and application. And this injection of flexibility into a system of categorical
rules could then undermine the certainty, predictability, and ease
of application that those rules aimed to achieve.

216. See Cooper, supra note 9, at 163-64; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 9, at 293302; Martineau, supra note 9, at 748-87; Nagel, supra note 9, at 214-22; see also Redish,
supra note 2, at 124-27; Steinman, supra note 6, at 1278-82.
217. See Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 6, at 24-25.
218. These are the likely benefits; whether or not categorical rules would achieve them
(and whether discretion would achieve them better) is a point of contention in the literature. I have argued elsewhere that this disagreement-and many of the other disagreements about the likely costs and benefits of any type of interlocutory appeal reform-is
abstract and not grounded in experience. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation, supra note 6, at 433-36. The arguments are based on perfectly reasonable assumptions about how people would react to different rules. Id. But those arguments are inconsistent with one another, and there is no theoretical way to resolve the difference. Id.
219. For more in-depth discussions of the over- and under-inclusiveness of rules, see
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58
(1992); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 268 (1974).
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One solution would be to follow the other camp of reformers,
switching entirely to a system of discretionary jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals. Again, I think that is unlikely: the Supreme Court does not seem to favor discretion, the limited work
that the Rules Committee has done on interlocutory appeal reform has focused on categorical rules, and a wholesale switch to
discretion is probably too radical a change in the short term. 20
So if appellate judges truly cannot entirely give up flexibility in
determining their jurisdiction, the allure of flexibility poses a
threat to successful reform. Categorical rules would likely be undermined by judges finding a way to reach what they think to be
sensible outcomes. And discretionary appeals, though embracing
judges' need to wield discretion, seem unlikely.
I propose a potential third way for reform: rather than rely
solely on categorical rules or solely on discretion, combine themcategorical rules coupled with a discretionary catch-all.2 21 Categorical rules could define what is (and what is not) appealable before a final judgment. These rules would be capped with a rule
giving courts discretion to hear appeals that do not fall under a
categorical rule. And unlike a wholesale switch to discretion, this
catch-all could (or at least could try to) guide the courts in their
exercise of discretion.
The Federal Rules of Evidence on hearsay illustrate this structure. The hearsay rules begin with a general definition of hearsay
and a prohibition on its admission." Dozens of categorical exceptions to this general prohibition then follow. 22 3' These are all
capped with Rule 807, the catch-all provision, which gives courts
220. See Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 6, at 24-25.
221. This proposal bears some similarity to Paul Carrington's proposed reform. He
suggested coupling a grant of authority to hear appeals "when essential to protect substantial rights that cannot be effectively enforced on review after final decision" with several rules defining appealable interlocutory orders. Carrington, supra note 9, at 167-68.
Among those several rules is one authorizing courts to promulgate rules defining appealable interlocutory orders (Carrington offered this proposal before Congress gave the Supreme Court power to promulgate these rules). See id. at 168. To the extent that Carrington's proposal to allow appeals necessary to protect substantial rights can be characterized
as discretion, I am building on his approach. But it is unclear how extensive a role Carrington envisioned for rulemaking under his proposal; I suggest that rulemaking sit front
and center. Cf. Glynn, supra note 9, at 261-62 (proposing that the number of categorical
rules permitting appeals be kept few).
222. FED. R. EVID. 801(c), 802.
223. Id. 801(d), 803, 804.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:371

discretion to deem hearsay admissible even if it does not meet one
of the categorical definitions.224 And Rule 807 guides this exercise
of discretion by telling courts what to consider in applying the
rule-particularly the reliability of the hearsay and whether the
hearsay is necessary given other potential evidence.225
Granted, codifying the law of interlocutory appeals via a mix of
categorical rules and a discretionary catch-all would in some
ways merely formalize the current system. As the system currently stands, some interlocutory district court orders are appealable
as a matter of right via a statutory, rule-based, or judge-made exception to the final judgment rule.22 Most others can, at least in
theory, be reviewed as a matter of discretion via express grants of
authority (such as section 1292(b) or writs of mandamus) or applications of judge-made exceptions (such as the collateral order
doctrine or the balancing approach).227 So the current system, in
practice, is already a mix of categories and discretion.
But codifying this system could have several benefits.22 8 First, it
could provide clarity. Clearly articulated rules on what can and
cannot be appealed before a final judgment would save courts and
litigants the time of determining jurisdiction under the current
system. Rather than search for previous cases allowing (or disal224. See id. 807.
225. See id. Both the general categorical approach to hearsay and the individual categories have their supporters and critics. See, e.g., Liesa L. Richter, Posnerian Hearsay:
Slaying the Discretion Dragon, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1861, 1862 (2015) (rejecting the purely discretionary model for evaluating hearsay); Richard A. Posner, On Hearsay, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1465, 1471 (2016) (concluding that the hearsay rule should be retained overall, but
the open-ended exception should be simplified and some of the hearsay exceptions should
be eliminated). I leave for later study how these debates could or should influence the development of interlocutory appeal reform.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), for example, gives litigants the right to appeal orders
"granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve
or modify injunctions." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012). Under the collateral order doctrine,
government officials have a right to appeal the denial of qualified immunity to the extent
the denial turns on an issue of law. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). That doctrine also gives a right to appeal in
several other situations, including the denials of Eleventh Amendment immunity, immunity under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and immunity under the Constitution's Speech or
Debate Clause. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
144 (1993) (Eleventh Amendment Immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-07
(1979) (Speech or Debate Clause Immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-60
(1977) (Double Jeopardy immunity).
227. See Steinman, supra note 6, at 1276-77.
228. Again, I present these as potential benefits. Whether categorical rules will actually attain them can be learned only through experience. See supranote 225.
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lowing) a similar appeal or determine if an exception to the finaljudgment rule applies, courts and litigants could look to the
rules.229
Along these same lines, codification could provide transparency
that the current system lacks. Some of the intricacies of interlocutory appeals are known only to the experienced appellate practitioner. In the current regime, where the rules of federal appellate
jurisdiction are spread across statutes, rules of procedure, and an
immense body of caselaw, litigants without that experience and
the luxury of time to acquire this expertise might fail to take appeals that they could have. Codification, even if it ends up resembling the current system, could thus democratize interlocutory
appeals.
And perhaps most importantly, codification--especially codification that includes an express avenue for judges to exercise discretion-could bring some much-needed candor to interlocutory
appeals. The current system requires judges to often channel exercises of discretion through stretched interpretation of the term
"final." The courts of appeals, after all, generally have jurisdiction
over only "final decisions." Since "final" equals "appealable,"
courts determined to hear an interlocutory appeal must find some
way to call the case final. And the reasons a court might want to
hear an appeal before a final judgment rarely has anything to do
with finality."' Channeling discretion through an explicit rule,
particularly one that requires courts to justify their exercise of
discretion, could transform these instances of stretched interpretation into candid discussions of whether or not a case could be
heard before a final judgment.
Codifying the current system could have several other benefits,
including resolving some of the outstanding circuit splits on matters of appellate jurisdiction. Even if codification resembled the
current system's practice of mixing largely categorical rules and
229. This is not to say that categorical rules would provide perfect clarity; there would
of course still be disputes in cases on the margins. We can see as much in the relatively
clear Rule 23(f), which contains some ambiguity at the margins. See, e.g., Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 687 F.3d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 2012) (addressing whether
an order modifying the scope of a previously certified class is appealable under Rule 23(f));
Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 639 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (addressing
whether an order denying a motion to amend a class certification order revives the time
for taking a Rule 23(f) appeal).
230. See Steinman, supranote 6, at 1253.
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exercises of discretion, the actual rules themselves would not
need to be the same; categorical rules could address troublesome
issues like attorney-client privilege appeals and immunity appeals.231
This is an extremely preliminary proposal absent any particulars. But it is a third way to approach appellate jurisdiction reform that accounts for the inevitability of discretion without fully
embracing it as the only basis for jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals.
CONCLUSION

The decisions of the courts of appeals reveal that the balancing
approach to finality is alive and perhaps even well. It continues to
play an important role in determining when an appeal can be
taken in a variety of contexts. Its persistence suggests that interlocutory appeal reform must account for appellate judges' inability to completely forego a flexible approach to their jurisdiction
with an eye toward achieving what they think to be just and reasonable results. This article has taken the first step of suggesting
an approach to reform that would account for flexibility while not
embracing it wholesale. The devil will ultimately be in the details, but those details are for another day and another article.

231.

See Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 6, at 30-33.

